ABSTRACT: This paper addresses a recent suggestion that moral particularists can extend their view to countenance default reasons (at a first stab, reasons that are pro tanto unless undermined) by relying on certain background expectations of normality. I first argue that normality must be understood non-extensionally. Thus if default reasons rest on normality claims, those claims won't bestow upon default reasons any definite degree of extensional generality. Their generality depends rather on the contingent distributional aspects of the world, which no theory of reasons should purport to settle. Appeals to default reasons cannot therefore uniquely support particularism. But this argument also implies that if moral generalism entailed that moral reasons by necessity have invariant valence (in the natural extensional sense), it would be a non-starter. Since generalism is not a nonstarter, my argument forces us to rethink the parameters of the generalism-particularism debate. Here I propose to clarify the debate by focusing on its modal rather than extensional aspects. In closing, I
INTRODUCTION
One feature of ordinary moral experience is that many particular facts immediately elicit a preliminary moral opinion that often remains stable on reflection. Examples would be regarding it as a moral reason for some response or other -such as action, attitude, or emotion -that someone is in danger, that this action would get a person something she needs, or that it would constitute lying. Insofar as our stable intuitive response is to treat such facts as moral reasons, our response would seem to treat many reasons as having a fair degree of generality. This much of ordinary moral thought might be taken to support generalist theories of moral reasons, according to which moral reasons depend on some suitable provision of general moral principles that 2 identify reasons. 1 The stability of our response, and the fact that we find its stability intelligible, suggest that it isn't arbitrary. Showing that it has a principled basis would be an excellent way of showing that it isn't arbitrary.
But is it the only way? Moral particularists claim that what considerations function as moral reasons depends fundamentally only on the nature of the particular case. They are notoriously keen to point out difficulties in modeling the way that constellations of particular facts which we regard as morally significant (say, that Jill is freezing or that Jack had his shoes stolen) might be captured in terms of general moral principles (say, a principle about helping those in need). Why not contrast arbitrary responses simply with those supported by reasons, and give a particularist account of our response? Most particularists grant that many reasons have a fair degree of generality, and a particularist account of our response should seek to explain how that can be so.
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I want to explore the notion of a default or presumptive reason, which particularists might invoke to provide such an account. Such a reason is usually characterized as -and this is how I'll use the term until further notice -a consideration which is a reason unless something prevents it from being so (Dancy 1999, p. 27) , or which is a pro tanto reason unless undermined (Cullity 2002, p. 188) . To unpack this, let's think of a reason (for an agent S) to φ as a consideration that favors (S's) φ-ing. And let's focus on those statements of reasons which express non-moral -and perhaps broadly empirical -facts or considerations, such as that someone is in distress or that I promised to do it. Then the initial notion introduced here is that of a non-moral consideration that carries a defeasible presumption that it favors bringing about certain things. (As we'll see, however, people who talk about default reasons often have in mind something richer.) Such reasons would naturally seem to invite from us a stable response that assigns to them some significant degree of generality. Thus the appeal to default reasons might help the particularist to bolster her case for the descriptive adequacy of her view.
My main aim in this paper is negative: I'll argue that if default reasons are to be at all relevant to the generalism-particularism debate, they must be construed as lacking precise implications concerning their extensional generality, by which I mean the ratio of cases in which reasons are undermined relative to those in which they aren't (rather than the generality or specificity of the reasons themselves or their the statements). As I'll show, their extensional generality depends on the sorts of contingent worldly matters which cannot ground moral reasons. They cannot therefore be recruited to provide any further support for particularism. (In particular, they aren't responsible for the stability of our responses noted at the outset.)
This result has wider ramifications. If the extensional generality of reasons depends on contingent worldly matters, then generalism is pretty much a non-starter if we take it to have any fairly precise extensional implications. This is what happens if we take it as the view that at least all basic or non-derivative reasons are invariant, for on the natural reading invariance is an extensional notion. Since I'm a generalist, I must reject this standard take. So I have a secondary, positive aim: I'll argue that the debate is better construed in terms of its modal than its extensional aspects. I want to explain how the sort of generalism we may expect to get as a result not only merits attention on its own, but also improves our grip on the notion of a default reason -even as it turns out to question the theoretical usefulness of the label 'default reason'.
As a final preliminary, I want to note that modal concerns are not all there is to the generalism-particularism debate. In fact, I believe that we must also consider its explanatory aspects and more robustly metaphysical aspects, which cannot be captured in purely modal terms. But I lack the space to address these issues here. Cullity (2002, pp. 184-185) . I should add that Cullity's formulations are almost certainly inadequate (although I believe they are good enough for the present purposes). They omit time and agent specifications, and perhaps they are best regarded as (enthymematic) instantiated forms of the relevant norms. It is also not clear whether 'φ' is supposed to stand for an acttoken or an act-type in both of its occurrences in a norm-formulation. Resolving these and related issues would require an excursion into action theory and philosophy of language that isn't possible here.
Thanks to Vivienne Brown for pressing these concerns.
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(1) φ-ing would be enjoyable
φ-ing would be forcing him against his will
In a recent paper, Garrett Cullity (2002) argues that a particularist can treat the reasons set out in practical norms like (1)-(5) as holistic reasons whose moral valence may vary, depending on the circumstances, but which also are pro tanto unless undermined.
Put roughly, the holistic claim is that reasons can vary from one context to another. That φ-ing would be enjoyable is a reason to φ, but it might be no reason at all when φ-ing would be enjoyment of something bad. 5 Similarly, when a person needs something for a malicious enterprise, its maliciousness means that (2) doesn't give a reason to give it to her. These reasons can be undermined by intervening considerations, such as the maliciousness of an enterprise, which defeat the favoring relation that a practical norm sets out between a reason and that for which it is a reason. The possibility of being undermined accounts for the holistic nature of the relevant reasons.
What about the idea that the considerations set out in (1)- (5) are pro tanto reasons unless something prevents them from being so? There are different options here. One might think the explanation lies in the connection between those considerations and "thick" properties such as kindness and respect. Cullity's account turns on their association with a good person's normative orientations: each gives us "the core of a virtue" (2002, p. 187) . For example, sometimes we ought to coerce people to abandon evil ends. But in these cases the normative orientation of coercion isn't contrary to (3), which is a norm that a respectful person should recognize. What is contrary to (3) is being the sort of person who enjoys domination, sees other people as mere means to his ends, and the like. This association with virtue is why the relevant reasons aren't merely prima facie, and why being properly responsive to reasons requires recognizing that considerations set out in (1)-(5) are reasons unless undermined. (Cullity 2002, p. 188 .)
The usual generalist response (but not one that I generally endorse -see §5) is to argue that (1)- (5) (Cullity 2002, p. 179) . But, third, it is in general fallacious to reason that if A wouldn't have happened in the presence of B, the absence of B should figure in a rational explanation of why A happened. Rather, the explanation it is rational to give of any phenomenon is relative to "background expectations of normality" (Cullity 2002, p. 178) . So (concludes Cullity), the expectations it is rational for an agent to have will constrain the content of her normative reasons.
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To illustrate, suppose I'm having some fun in circumstances C and this raises no questions of permissibility for me. If it is a rational expectation about C that having fun 6 See e.g. Shafer-Landau (1997), Sinnott-Armstrong (1999), Raz (1999), and Hooker (2000a Asher & Morreau (1995, p. 314) , Pelletier & Asher (1997 , p. 1164 ), and Priest (1999 .
The target notion so characterized in Morreau (1997, p. 200ff.) is regularity. But that term is often used, in the sense that is relevant here, interchangeably with 'normality,' 'typicality,' etc. (Pelletier & Asher 1997 , p. 1129 .
11 Therefore, as Bonevac (1998, p. 42) notes, p-normal worlds relative to w must not be construed as the closest p-worlds relative to w.
be normal in its own terms with respect to its specific conditions: things may not, on occasion, behave there as they tend to behave there.
12
The idea that what is normal depends on the general shape of the world is reflected in our background assumptions. I expect that if I thoroughly heat a dry piece of wood, it will catch fire. Similarly, when it perceptually seems to me that p, I tend to judge that p. Built into this tendency is the expectation that my perceptual conditions lack perturbing factors, and therefore don't undermine the conclusion that as things seem so they are (and as they are so they seem). These are the sort of perceptual conditions that we think of as normal. So our background expectations of normality commit us to substantive assumptions about our environment.
There is a further respect in which normality is a relational notion: a world may be normal or abnormal, in virtue of some condition or other, in one respect but not others. Tweety, a bird, may be normal for a bird regarding being feathered but not regarding flying. Tweety will be abnormal for a bird regarding flying if he is a penguin.
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In the actual run of things, both (6) and (7) Such a world would be one in which dry pieces of wood aren't combustible in virtue of its general shape. 13 These claims are to be understood as implicitly relative also to the actual world. There should be possible worlds where Tweety is a perfectly normal bird and yet cannot fly, these simply being possible worlds where it isn't true that birds can normally fly (Asher & Morreau 1995, p. 312) . (6) Birds fly.
(7) Birds that are penguins don't fly.
Sentences such as (6) have some notable characteristics. First, they are modal statements: their truth values do not depend (just) on actual matters of fact. Second, they are generic statements: they report a general property of individual instances of a kind, which transcends particular facts. 14 (6) makes a claim not about the closed class of existing birds, but about (some set of) (realistically) possible birds. Third, generics tolerate exceptions: (6) can be true even if not all birds fly. In general, the truth of a generic claim allows that not all instances of the kind have the property predicated of them.
It is attractive to explain the exception-tolerating character of generics by saying that generics imply certain normality claims. Evaluated relative to w, (6) predicates the property of flying only of those birds which are found in worlds that are normal with respect to w and which aren't abnormal with respect to the property of flying, but instead 14 I should note that this characterization can be denied in the case of kind-referring uses of definite descriptions, such as an utterance of the generic 'The tiger has stripes.' The referent of this sentence could be claimed to be a unique contextually salient tiger. Further, just one type of generics is characterized here. Another type of generic statement reports a property of the kind itself; consider 'The potato was first cultivated in South America.' I'll set this sort of generic statements aside in this paper. On the entire spectrum of generics, see e.g. the papers in Carlson & Pelletier (ed.) (1995) .
fly in the appropriate circumstances. 15 Many exceptions (such as penguins) can themselves be expressed by true generics -witness (7).
This sort of relation between generics and normality would help to explain why generics support inferences such as this: (8) Tweety is a bird.
Birds fly.
Therefore, Tweety flies.
16
The status of (8) as a reasonable inference depends on the substantive assumptions about the general shape of our environment to which accepting (6) commits us, and thus
on assumptions about what counts as normal. Of course, we might reason as we do in (8) and yet, given evidence that Tweety is a penguin, retract the conclusion that Tweety flies -but without retracting any of the original premises or without saying that the original inference was unreasonable. 17 Our background expectations of normality reflect 15 As Pelletier & Asher (1997 , p. 1162 note, the relevant set of normal worlds won't be fixed independently of the topic of the generalization: 'is a bird' will determine, presumably by the nature of birds, certain respects (such as flying and being feathered) as the relevant ones.
16 Implicit here is the alternative option of thinking that generics such as birds fly specify default rules of inference (Reiter 1980) . The problem with this is that rules of inference cannot be true or false; they only transmit truth, more or less intact, from the premises to the conclusion. But birds fly seems true.
17 Thus reasoning involving generics is non-monotonic. A bit more precisely, an inference is non-monotonic if the set of premises Γ generates conclusion φ but the premises (Γ ∪ ψ), for some ψ not in Γ, don't generate conclusion φ. The contrast is with monotonic logics, such as the standard first-order logic, in this as well. To assume that Twyla is normal for a bird is to assume, roughly, that
Twyla is as normal in certain respects as is consistent with Twyla's being a bird. If
Twyla is a penguin, and birds that are penguins don't fly, we cannot consistently assume that Twyla is normal regarding flying, and we'll retract the conclusion that Twyla flies if we realize she is a penguin. Priest (1999, p. 200) suggests that non-monotonically valid inferences are truth-preserving in all "normal situations." On this proposal, φ must hold in all models of Γ that are as normal as Γ will let them be.
REASONS, NORMALITY, AND NASTY WORLDS
Throw in ψ, and φ doesn't necessarily hold in all models of (Γ ∪ ψ) that are as normal as (Γ ∪ ψ) will let them be. The proposal handles (8) nicely, and something like it lies at the core of many current accounts of non-monotonic inference. For a proposal along similar model-theoretic lines which is more ecumenical regarding the selection of presupposed models, see Morgan (2000, pp. 347-352) .
straightforward. The latter reading is clearly the intended one. (However, it turns out not to matter for my argument which one we pick.) But does the notion of a default reason entail that most circumstances are straightforward?
Let's return to generic statements. Suppose we read (5) as saying that promising to φ is a default reason to φ. Then it at least entails the generic statement (9):
(9) Promises give reasons to keep them.
As a generic claim, (9) tolerates exceptions, as it should if the reasons it specifies can be undermined. A parallel treatment with (6) would model this by saying that (9) predicates the property of being reason-giving of (to put it roughly) those promises that aren't abnormal with respect to that property. (9) is meant to be compatible with claims that set out tolerable exceptions to it, such as (10):
(10) Manipulated promises give no reasons to keep them.
The compatibility is desirable because (arguably) if I'm tricked or coerced into making a promise, this undermines the status of I promised to φ as a reason for me to φ.
But does (9) entail that most cases of promising are straightforward? It does so only if in most cases the status of I promised φ as a reason is not undermined. But compare (9) and (6). The truth of (6) doesn't require, on the extensional level, that most birds fly. (6) could have been true even if it had so happened that most birds were penguins, emus, kiwis, ostriches, etc., or had clipped wings. Also consider (11):
(11) Turtles die young.
Most turtles die in infancy as they rush to safety in the sea. But although (11) 'normal' must be given some non-extensional meaning. But then (9) does not imply that most promises give reasons to keep them. The actual extension of promises that
give reasons has almost nothing to with whether (9) is true or not. (9) allows that most promises may be manipulated, that promises usually don't give reasons to keep them, and so on. Nothing in the notion of a default reason implies that complicated cases are rare. Thus we cannot assume that if default reasons entail normality claims, those claims bestow upon default reasons any relatively definite degree of extensional generality. Therefore we must reject Cullity's construal of normality claims.
A weaker option is that rational background expectations assume simply that circumstances normally are straightforward, so that they normally raise no questions about the permissibility of our actions. Suppose p is a default reason to φ. Then, on this view, p is normally a reason to φ only if such expectations are rational. Now they may in fact be rational. But whether they are rational depends on a variety of additional factors. What I deny is that p's being a default reason as such makes it rational to assume that cases where p holds are normally straightforward.
We can assume that circumstances are normally straightforward only if we can also assume it to be part of the general shape of the world that promises aren't manipulated, enjoyment isn't enjoyment of something bad, and so on. No such assumption, however warranted, follows simply from the notion of a consideration that is a reason unless undermined. For the possibility of such reasons doesn't show we couldn't have been so unfortunate as to live in what I'll call a Nasty World.
A Nasty World is a world where -whether by nature, nurture, or both -human interaction is coercive and fraudulent and human psychology sadistic, deceitful, and perverse. The endeavors of the denizens of such a world would provide no rational basis for a general expectation that promises, enjoyments, and other considerations are normal with respect to reason-giving, since they would normally be undermined, and so would normally not give reasons. Manipulative situations, for example, would be in the relevant sense normal with respect to promise-making -these are the sorts of situations in which promisors in a Nasty World tend to find themselves, thanks to the general shape of their world. 18 Since manipulated promises, at least qua promises, are abnormal with respect to reason-giving, it follows that in a Nasty World the fact I promised φ wouldn't normally
give me a reason. So, again, being a default reason doesn't entail normally being a reason.
We are now in a position to draw some morals. One is that, insofar as promises are normally manipulated (and, perhaps, we have some awareness of this sorry fact), it will be no part of rational background expectations of normality that the circumstances of promising are straightforward. Then it won't do to argue that the reasons had by the denizens of Nasty Worlds can have the simple contents set out in (1)- (5) by appealing to background expectations of normality. But, intuitively, a relatively simple consideration can be a reason unless undermined even when contingencies make it rational to expect that it normally is undermined. 19 The fact I promised to φ looks to be capable of functioning as a reason for the denizens of Nasty Worlds to do as promised, even as their normal promise-making situations would be such as to normally undermine the reason-giving status of promises. 20 Intuitively, such a fact can function as a reason so 18 As noted in §3, generics appeal to normality conditions for both situations and objects (here, promises). See also Krifka et al. (1995, p. 31ff.) . 19 Perhaps when rational agents in Nasty Worlds fail to respond differentially depending on whether a reason is undermined, this is a mistake within rationality, insofar as one needn't be irrational for failing to know when a reason isn't undermined in circumstances where it normally is undermined. 20 To test your intuitions about this, consider (à la Cullity) what response a good person's normative orientations would yield in such cases. It seems clear to me that an appropriately informed good person would take her having made a promise as a reason to keep it. The separate question why people would bother to make promises at all in Nasty Worlds, though perhaps practically pressing, is tangential here.
long as no undermining conditions obtain. So, considerations such as I promised to φ can be, relative to w, reasons unless undermined even if promises made in situations that in w are normal for promise-making don't in w normally give reasons to keep them. These claims cannot be vindicated by appealing to normality claims.
Another moral we can draw is that there is an important respect in which it would be misleading to say that, relative to a Nasty World, making a promise gives by default a reason to do as promised, even if promises do so in the actual world. If promises normally are manipulated in Nasty Worlds, this is probably due to their having contingent initial conditions that are sufficiently far-fetched from our point of view. In general, whether promises normally are manipulated is contingent on the general shape of the world (which is itself a contingent matter). If by a default assumption we mean one that automatically entitles us to proceed in a certain way, absent interfering factors, then promises fail to have a default status in Nasty Worlds. It won't do to proceed on the assumption that promise-making is reason-giving. In particular, there is no intuitive sense in which I promised to φ entitles me to presume that I have a reason to φ, absent evidence to the contrary. So, even if a consideration functions as a default reason in our official sense, this doesn't entail that it functions as an epistemic default with respect to its being reason-giving. It might do so in the actual world, but it well might not in Nasty
Worlds; yet it might be true in both worlds that it is a reason unless undermined.
Epistemic defaults are no doubt important to our moral knowledge in many ways that I cannot explore here. 21 All that I want presently to note is that being an epistemic default in the above sense is distinct from being a reason unless undermined because it depends on further contingent facts about the general shape of the world. I needn't mind if considerations that are reasons unless undermined are called default reasons (this has so far been our official sense of the term), so long as we handle
properly the reason why they are distinct from epistemic defaults. and that this is because the evidential valence of an appearance that p (that is, being such as to favor believing that p) bears also on situations where appearances are misleading or unreliable (because of the drugs one has ingested, or whatever). I have some doubts about whether moral reasons exhibit this sort of explanatory asymmetry (see §7 and n. 35). I take no stand on epistemic reasons here.
23 Accordingly, Roger Crisp isn't entirely fair when he writes (in response to claims like those cited in n. 2 above) that "if particularism is true, we should perhaps be a little surprised that certain considerations dominate our ethical thinking, whereas others do not" (Crisp 2000, p. 36 n. 42 ).
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we take a whole slew of assumptions about our surroundings implicitly for granted: we assume that people normally aren't manipulative, normally have done nothing that justifies killing them, and so on. These are (probably rational) contingent assumptions, here concerning the general shape of the actual world rather than its specific distributional aspects.
It is, I think, clear that neither of these two sorts of contingent assumptions are entailed by the normative connection between reasons and the actions for which they are reasons, which figures in practical norms of the general form (13):
Such norms serve merely to restrict the connection between non-moral and moral possibilities. They don't restrict the non-moral possibilities themselves or, therefore, the distributional aspects or the general shape of the worlds where they hold.
It would then be very odd if either generalism or particularism by itself had any definite implications concerning these contingent matters. They are in the first instance broadly metaphysical doctrines about the role of moral principles regarding the status of certain facts as moral reasons -about whether the status of (say) I promised to φ as a moral reason to φ depends on whether (5) The question is whether a viable notion of that sort is available to the generalist. Since reasons that are invariable without qualification cannot be undermined, the generalist needs to deny that moral principles determine reasons that are invariable in this sense.
The literature on both sides largely agrees that this move is a pipedream for the generalist. This is because of the orthodoxy that generalists cannot allow the holistic claim that the very valence of a reason may vary depending on the circumstances. One sign of the powerful hold of the assumption is that generalists typically defend their principles against particularist counterexamples by complication. To take a toy example, when the generalist says (claiming to affirm a principle) 'That an act would be enjoyable is a reason for doing it' and the particularist retorts 'Not if the pleasure is sadistic,' the usual response is 'All right, that an act would be a case of non-sadistic enjoyment is a reason for doing it.' But if what is being affirmed is a revised take on an invariant reason, then the response should often seem beside the point. Suppose, on the one hand, that it turns out that there in fact always is a reason to go for non-sadistic enjoyment. The particularist can explain this by saying 'The reason to do it is simply that it would be enjoyable. But as it turns out, whenever an enjoyable act isn't sadistic, no further conditions for its presence fail.' Suppose, on the other hand, that there is no reason to go for some non-sadistic enjoyments. For the generalist, this means the existence of counterexamples, while the particularist only needs to give up a contingent factual claim.
But whatever further complications the generalist offers in response to the counterexamples, the particularist can replicate her retort if she likes -ad nauseam. The way out is to deny that generalist theories of moral reasons must affirm a necessary connection between being a reason and being invariable without qualification.
The option I favor is to construe generalism as claiming that reasons needn't be invariable within the universal domain, but only in some appropriately restricted domain.
A reason that is invariable in this sense isn't thereby invariable without qualification, for its moral valence is allowed to vary outside the relevant domain. It can clearly be a reason unless undermined, since reasons that are invariable in this sense must be distinguished 
OUTLINING MODERATE MORAL GENERALISM
The view of pro tanto moral principles I want to describe has three basic elements.
A. FAVORING. Just like norms of the form (13), a given principle specifies a relationship of favoring between some non-moral consideration p and φ-ing. 28 The largely dialectic argument for the compatibility of generalism and the holism of reasons that I offer here complements the argument that I offer for the same conclusion in my "Moral Generalism:
Enjoy in Moderation" (unpublished). In that paper, I also defend in a bit greater detail some of the dialectic claims I make above, and argue that even a stronger form of holism than the one I operate with here can be explained from purely generalist premises. See also McKeever & Ridge (2005) . I want now to run a manifesto on further points that the view scores.
As desired, the view is silent on how widely the hedging conditions hold; this is left to depend also on the world's distributional aspects and general shape.
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As designed, the view respects the holism of reasons. 33 It draws a distinction between reasons and conditions for the presence of reasons. Hedged moral principles allow the moral valence of reasons to vary when the hedging conditions aren't satisfied.
As should be possible (already by holism), some reasons may be invariable without qualification all the same. In my terms, one way this might happen is that a consideration that functions as a reason somehow (not necessarily conceptually) has its normative force "built into" it, so that the reason gets to bear the required relation to a normative basis without further ado by containment. Perhaps the example Cullity (2002, p. 182) gives of an "invariant" reason -that inflicting suffering on others for your own enjoyment always counts against an action -is like that.
As advertised, the view predicts that the current orthodoxy in the generalism- Defaultness is a property of the valencies that considerations have (Kirchin 2003, p. 70 n. 22) . The notions of defaults we have so far weeded out had to go because they involved extensional, normality, or epistemic assumptions that are independent of generalist and particularist theories of moral reasons. But in the literature one also finds the distinct idea that some considerations need no further conditions to "enable" them 61). Call these moral defaults. Metaphorically, the idea is that moral defaults "start out" as reasons -they "arrive switched on," as Dancy puts it -but may be "switched off" in certain sorts of contexts. 35 So when a fact is a moral default, this is akin to being a default setting of a computer program: the reason-giving status kicks in automatically when the fact obtains, and stays put unless something changes the setting.
The problem I want to raise here is that the moderate generalist account of itself shows nothing about the metaphysics of reasons. Denizens of Nasty Worlds might be in an epistemic predicament where there is something to explain. More generally, even if the feature carries moral valence "on its own," that fact may be both unobvious and explainable. Also, the view sketched in §6 can allow this kind of explanatory asymmetry while denying the metaphysical asymmetry I challenge in the text below.
35 default looks to require. But then the interest and the usefulness of moral defaults to debates concerning contextually unanimous reasons -on which I have argued the success of generalism to hang -will be severely limited.
I conclude that people talking about moral defaults have in mind a notion that is richer than our initial notion of a reason that can be undermined, but the richer notion has neither a clear rationale nor a clear bearing on the central issues at stake in the generalism-particularism debate. As with epistemic defaults, it doesn't much matter if we stick the label 'default reason' onto our initial notion. But the label 'defeasible reason' strikes me as perfectly adequate and less liable to mislead.
To be sure, there are ways of relaxing the above account of moral defaults which make it compatible with moderate generalism. For instance, we might allow the modal profile of moral defaults to depend also on the character of the world -more weakly than in the case of epistemic defaults, but even so. There may be worlds, even more far out than Nasty Worlds, whose general moral truths differ from ours because the systematic connections between moral and non-moral possibilities differ from those that hold in worlds like ours. Perhaps the denizens of some worlds evolved into really good lie-detectors, in which case lying wouldn't deceive and there arguably would be no basis for regarding lying as wrong-making in such a world. Then we could say that lying has a default status, but only relative to certain sorts of worlds: although lying doesn't "start out" with negative valence in lie-detector worlds, in some sense it does so in worlds like ours, in virtue of the connection between lying and the relevant normative basis. perhaps). They differ on the considerations that enter into the principles and the conditions under which those considerations function as reasons. Because the view I favor is sensitive to this sort of circumstantial variations, it can explain how and why the principles operative in far-out worlds might be intelligibly different from ours by indicating how they are related to ours. It can therefore explain how and why the principles we accept might intelligibly have been different. Note also that even if the modal profiles of hedged moral principles have this sort of limits, they may nonetheless serve to express necessary moral truths about given worlds. Hooker (2000b, pp. 231-234) discusses the general issue (in the context of two-tier theories).
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